Simulation Objection

In the art world, the painting Magritte's Pipe receives some attention.

• The painting shows a picture of a pipe, BUT
• the picture is not the same thing as a real pipe.

Analogously, the Simulation Objection argues that a computer might perform processing that simulates intelligence, but that might be different from having actual intelligence.

Copeland addresses this objection as follows:

• Define two types of simulation:
  • simulation₁ is a simulation that "lacks essential features of whatever is being simulated." (p. 47)
  • simulation₂ is "exactly like whatever is being simulated except that it hasn't been produced in the usual way but by some non standard means, perhaps under laboratory conditions." (p. 47)
• Possible examples of a Type 2 Simulation (again from Copeland):
  • Some coal produced artificially may share all characteristics as natural coal, except the means of production.
  • We could imagine an artificial voice having the qualities of a natural speaker (although some applications fall far short).
• With this distinction, Copeland observes that the Simulation Objection does not distinguish between the two types of simulation.
  • The objection seems to claim (without argument) that all simulations are type 1
  • Claiming Type 2 simulations can never have intelligence simply defines the question away – without argument

created 8 January 2007 last revised 8 January 2007

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